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The goals of this study are to empirically identify fraud risk
factors and construct a model to predict the likelihood of financial
statement frauds based on SAS No. 99. Employing logistic regres-
sion on 143 firms, this research  finds that fraud risk factor proxies
for Pressure—net profit/total assets—and Opportunity— inventory/
total assets ratio, related party transactions, and Big 4—are signifi-
cantly associated with fraudulent financial statements, whereas
none of the fraud risk factor proxies for Rationalization is signifi-
cantly associated with fraudulent financial statements. Consistent
with prior research, it seems that the likelihood of fraudulent
financial statements is easier to be observed publicly using fraud
risk factor proxies for Pressure and Opportunity rather than Ratio-
nalization. The constructed model can correctly classify firms with
a relatively high success rate.
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Introduction
In the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury, business world was upset by a
series of corporate financial and ac-
counting scandals; Enron, WorldCom,
and Xerox are just a few companies
that daunted public trust and dissi-
pated tremendous dollars of market
capitalization. Five companies –Enron,
WorldCom, Qwest, Tyco, and Global
Crossing– and their respective losses
on their market capitalization caused
by accounting scandals accounted to
approximately $460 billion (Cotton
2002). Enron’s loss itself totaled
around $70 billion (Rezaee 2005). A
financial fraud assessment survey con-
ducted by KPMG (2003) finds that 70
percent of the responding companies
have experienced at least one type of
fraud, increasing by 13 percent com-
pared to the results obtained with the
same survey in 1998.
These and other series of financial
frauds and accounting scandals seem-
ingly fostered AICPA to issue
the Statement on Auditing Standards
(SAS) No. 99, “Consideration of Fraud
in a Financial Statement Audit”, in
October 2002, which superseded SAS
No. 53 (1988) and SAS No. 82 (1997).
SAS No. 99 consists of an extensive
list of fraud risk indicators. The Stan-
dard advocates for auditors to be
more cautious in the audit process.
This research intends to identify
fraud risk factors stated in SAS No. 99
(AICPA 2002) –perceived Pressure/
Incentive, Opportunity, and Attitude/
Rationalization– and empirically re-
lates those factors to the impending
likelihood of financial statement fraud.
This study also aims to construct a
fraud prediction model to predict the
likelihood of financial statement fraud
based on the identified fraud risk fac-
tors. Financial statement fraud usually
involves management because man-
agers can directly or indirectly ma-
nipulate accounting records and
present fraudulent financial informa-
tion by overriding controls or direct-
ing employees to carry out the fraud.
Even though it is difficult to discover
fraud (Albrecht et al. 2006), fraudu-
lent activities can still be predicted by
considering certain conditions.
Using sample data mainly from
Audit Analytics for financial restate-
ment database, SEC EDGAR for gov-
ernance mechanism information, and
COMPUSTAT database for financial
information, this study makes use of
several variables present for fraudu-
lent firms and possibly absent for non-
fraudulent firms, and empirically tests
them in order to identify and detect
fraud risk factors and relates them to
the likelihood of financial statement
frauds. Firstly, a sample was selected
from the Audit Non-Reliable (Restate-
ment) of Audit Analytics to obtain
firms engaged in fraudulent financial
statement activities (financial fraud,
irregularities, and misrepresentation).
Secondly, data on governance mecha-
nisms from SEC’s EDGAR and finan-
cial information from COMPUSTAT
database were used as accompanying
attributes of fraudulent and non-fraudu-
lent firms sample.
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This research finds that a Pressure
proxy variable –net profit/total assets–
and Opportunity proxy variables –in-
ventory/total assets, related party trans-
action (RPTRANS) and Big 4/5 audit
firms (BIG4)– are significantly related
to the tendency of committing fraud,
whereas Rationalization proxy vari-
ables are insignificantly related to the
likelihood of fraudulent financial state-
ment. Rationalization of fraud is ap-
parently the most difficult factor among
other fraud triangle elements to be
observed by public data. Furthermore,
the findings include the construction
of a fraud prediction model, which
accurately predicts fraud with a suc-
cess rate up to 67.1 percent. By using
cross validation method, this model
can correctly classify non-fraudulent
firms by 77 percent and fraudulent
firms by 51 percent.
Theory and Hypotheses
Development
Fraud detection has become a criti-
cal concern of researchers and aca-
demics, and this leads them to conduct
a myriad of empirical research. Fraud
triangle –Pressure, Opportunity, and
Rationalization– is a well recognized
technique used to examine fraud oc-
currences. The fraud triangle was
widely introduced by Cressey in 1953
after conducting research on inmates
who had been alleged of violation of
financial trust. Cressey (1953) argues
that a fraud triangle is always present
when a fraud occurs. AICPA (2002)
has adopted this theory and further
proposes it in SAS No. 99. Based on
the proposal, AICPA (2002) claims
that only one fraud risk factor needs to
be present for the occurrence of fraud.
AICPA (2002) defines fraud in
SAS No. 99 as an intentional act that
results in a material misstatement in
financial statements, which are the
subject of the audit. The Standard rec-
ognizes two types of misstatements
pertaining to auditor’s consideration
of fraud: (1) misstatement arising from
fraudulent financial reporting and (2)
misstatement arising from misappro-
priation of assets. This study is specifi-
cally focused on fraudulent financial
reporting. SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002)
defines fraudulent financial reporting
as intentional misstatements or omis-
sions of monetary amounts or disclo-
sures in financial statements designed
to deceive financial statement users,
disregarding critical financial infor-
mation and violating the conformity to
the generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples (GAAP). Financial statement
fraud generally involves intention and
deception by knowledgeable people
(e.g., top executives, auditors) with a
set of well-planned schemes and a
considerable gamesmanship (Rezaee
2005).
Three conditions depicted in SAS
No. 99 are present in fraudulent be-
haviors:
1. Pressure. Pressure constitutes an
incentive to act in a given manner.
Likewise, being under pressure in-
creases the probability of commit-
ting fraud; for instances: financial
needs, needs for providing better
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results than actual performance,
frustration with work, or even a
challenge to manipulate the system.
Albrecht et al. (2006) state that fraud
can be perpetrated to benefit one-
self or to benefit an organization.
They provide four types of Pressure
examples: (1) financial pressure, (2)
vice, (3) work-related pressure, and
(4) other pressure.
2. Opportunity. Opportunity is defined
as existing circumstances –such as
the absence of controls, ineffective
controls, or the ability of manage-
ment to override controls– that pro-
vides an opportunity for fraud to be
perpetrated. Albrecht et al. (2006)
argue that Opportunity is perceived
as concealing or avoiding punish-
ments. They also note six major
factors that increase opportunities
for an individual to commit frauds
within an organization: (1) lack of
or circumvention of controls pur-
ported to prevent or detect fraudu-
lent behaviors, (2) inability to judge
quality of performance, (3) failure
to discipline fraud perpetrators, (4)
lack of access to information, (5)
ignorance, apathy, and incapacity,
and (6) lack of a fraud audit.
3. Rationalization (Attitude). Those
involved in financial statement fraud
are able to rationalize fraudulent
acts as being consistent with their
personal code of ethics. Some indi-
viduals possess attitudes, charac-
ters or set of ethical values that
allow them to knowingly and inten-
tionally commit dishonest acts.
This research develops hypoth-
eses derived from the fraud triangle
above as introduced by SAS No. 99.
Therefore, this study empirically hy-
pothesizes that the fraud risk factors –
categorized by Pressure, Opportunity,
and Rationalization– are associated
with the higher likelihood of fraudu-
lent financial reporting.
FRAUD = f (Pressure, Opportunity,
Rationalization)
Each fraud risk factor will be
proxied by associated variables. Hence,
the variables used in this research are
as follows:
Pressure Variables
Albrecht et al. (2006) state that
financial ratios can be a useful tool for
detecting fraudulent financial report-
ing. Financial ratio is one of the ana-
lytical procedures, as SAS No. 99 sug-
gests, derived from an entity’s finan-
cial and operational data to help audi-
tor identify fraud (Kaminski et al.
2004). Unusual changes in financial
ratios may indicate fraudulent activi-
ties carried out by managers. Some of
the financial ratios utilized by this
research are: financial leverage, capi-
tal turnover, and profitability, which
serve as proxies for Pressure. This
research predicts that these financial
ratios are associated with fraudulent
financial reporting.
1. Financial Leverage - Total Liabil-
ity/Total Assets (LEV). Financial
distress may be an incentive factor
for management to commit fraud
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(Loebbecke et al. 1989; Stice 1991;
Kirkos et al. 2007). In this study,
total liability/total assets or finan-
cial leverage (LEV) is used as a
proxy for Pressure. Persons (1995)
suggests that there is an association
between higher leverage and higher
likelihood of loan agreement viola-
tion, and also an association be-
tween higher leverage and less abil-
ity to obtain additional funding
through borrowing. Furthermore,
management typically tends to
manipulate financial statements to
cope with the requirement for cov-
enants (Kirkos et al. 2007). Thus,
this investigation expects to ob-
serve a positive and statistically
significant link between financial
distress and the likelihood of
fraudulent financial statements.
H1a: Firms with higher financial
leverage will be more likely
to engage in financial state-
ment frauds.
2. Capital Turnover - Sales/Total As-
sets (SALTA). Capital turnover
measures the sales generating
power of a firm’s assets and also
management ability to deal with
competitive situations (Pearsons
1995). He argues that fraudulent
firm management may be less com-
petitive than that of non-fraudulent
firms in using the firm’s assets to
generate sales. If a firm is not able
to successfully compete, it may be
fostered to produce fraudulent fi-
nancial statements (Persons 1995).
Therefore, this study expects to see
an association between capital turn-
over and fraudulent financial state-
ments.
H1b: Firms with lower net sales/
total assets ratio will be more
likely to engage in financial
statement frauds.
3. Profitability - Net Profit/Total As-
sets (NPROFTA). Persons (1995)
states that firms with lower profit-
ability are likely to overstate rev-
enues or underestimate expenses.
Kreutzfeldt and Wallace (1986) and
Persons (1995) find that firms with
lower profitability are significantly
linked to have more errors in their
financial statements than firms with
higher profitability. This research
uses net profit/total assets
(NPROFTA), and expects that
NPROFTA is significantly associ-
ated with fraudulent financial state-
ments.
H1c: Firms with lower net profits/
total assets ratio will be more
likely to engage in financial
statement frauds.
Opportunity Variables
Opportunity, in this study, con-
sists of related party transaction, Big
4, and inventory/total assets ratio.
1. Related Party Transaction
(RPTRANS). SAS No. 99 suggests
that auditors should consider re-
lated party transaction to be one of
the fraud risk factors since it pro-
vides opportunities to engage in
fraudulent financial reporting. Re-
lated party transaction is defined as
a transaction done between a com-
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pany and an insider —in the form
of a subsidiary, family-related com-
pany, employee, and so forth. This
kind of transaction may not reflect
arm’s —length bargaining, which
is a crucial point for revenue recog-
nition between independent par-
ties. Carmichael (1999) states if a
transaction materially differs from
its economic substance, profit rec-
ognition should generally be de-
ferred. Related party transaction,
unfortunately, for many cases is
allegedly used to manipulate earn-
ings, loot companies, and commit
frauds (Young 2005). Young (2005)
also asserts that recent frauds in
Enron, Tyco, Adelphia, WorldCom,
and Holingger typically involved
related party transactions. Chen and
Elder (2007) consistently find that
firms with more related party trans-
actions tend to engage in fraud.
Therefore, this study expects to
observe a positive relationship be-
tween related party transactions and
the likelihood of financial state-
ment frauds.
H2a: Firms involved related party
transactions will be more
likely to engage in financial
statement frauds.
2. Big 4 (BIG4). Prior studies find an
association between audit-firm
quality and Big 4 (audit-firm size).
Big 4 represents the four largest
international accounting firms
(Deloitte & Touche, Ernst and
Young, KPMG, and Price-
waterhouse Coopers). Palmrose
(1988) finds that Big 8 has higher
audit quality shown by low litiga-
tion activities than does Non-Big 8.
Audit-firm quality is proxied by
audit-firm size, brand name, and its
ability to mitigate agency problems
(DeFond 1992). Farber (2005) con-
sistently shows that fraudulent firms
have fewer instances of employing
Big 4 audit firms. These findings
indicate that Big 4 audit-firm size
provides better audit-firm quality
than does Non-Big 4, and reduces a
firm’s opportunity to engage in
frauds. Therefore, this study pre-
dicts that fraudulent firms are more
likely to have a lower probability of
employing a Big 4 audit firm.
H2b: Firms audited by a Big 4
audit firm will be less likely
to engage in fraudulent fi-
nancial reporting.
3. Inventory/Total Assets (INVTA).
Inventory is one of the easiest ac-
counts to manipulate (Stice 1991;
Person 1995), since inventories in-
volve a subjective estimation that
makes it more difficult to be au-
dited. Therefore, it is prone to
fraudulent falsification (Kirkos et
al. 2007). Inventory fraud typically
exerts some methods such as re-
porting inventories at a lower cost
and recording obsolete inventories
(Kirkos et al. 2007). Persons (1995)
finds that fraudulent firms tend to
have higher inventory/total assets
(INVTA) than do non-fraudulent
firms. This study uses inventory/
total assets (INVTA) as one of the
Pressure proxies, and expects
INVTA to have a positive associa-
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tion with fraudulent financial state-
ments.
H2c: Firms with higher inventory/
total assets ratio will be more
likely to engage in financial
statement frauds.
Rationalization Variables
Skousen and Wright (2006) argue
that even though Rationalization is a
necessary factor in the fraud triangle,
it is still very difficult to observe an
individual’s rationale. Furthermore,
they do not find any significant fraud
risk factors as proxies for Rationaliza-
tion. Ramos (2003) states that auditors
cannot possibly know with certainty
what a person’s ethical standards and
beliefs are. Even more, Brazel et al.
(2007) do not include any fraud risk
factors as proxies for Rationalization
in their empirical research. They state
that it is very limited or even unavail-
able public data to be surrogates for
management rationales or attitudes.
On the other hand, Ramos (2003) notes
that auditors may become aware of
circumstances that indicate the pos-
sible presence of an attitude that po-
tentially induces fraud risk. Chen and
Elder (2007) find some significant
fraud risk factors, such as the number
of earnings restatement, the number of
internal auditor switches, and the num-
ber of internal auditor switches, as
proxies for Rationalization or Atti-
tude. In addition, audit qualifications
are perceived to have a negative effect
on a firm’s stock price (Chow and Rice
1982) and its ability to borrow funds
(Schwartz and Menon 1985). Accord-
ingly, a firm with a qualified opinion
may change to other auditors. This fact
is exemplified by research conducted
by Johnson and Lys (1990) and
Krishnan, Krishnan, and Stephens
(1996) which find that firms tend to
change auditors after receiving a quali-
fied opinion. Following Chen and El-
der (2007), Johnson and Lys (1990),
and Krishnan, Krishnan, and Stephens
(1996), this study involves auditor
change (AUDCHANG) and audit opin-
ion (AO) as proxies for Rationaliza-
tion. These variables will be accompa-
nied by the going concern report (GC)
variable, which is expected to be a
suitable parameter for Rationalization.
1. Auditor Change (CPA). Manage-
ment is more likely to switch its
auditors in anticipation of some
agency conflicts (DeFond 1992).
Schewartz and Menon (1985) theo-
rize about failing firms having a
greater tendency to switch auditors
than do healthier firms. Further-
more, they argue that failing firms
that change their auditors have pref-
erences to switch to a different class
of CPA firms. However, they also
note that the size of the auditing
firm does not have a considerable
implication. Chen and Elder (2007)
state that firms with more frequent
audit switches are more likely to
engage in financial reporting frauds.
Therefore, this study follows this
hypothesis accordingly, and expects
a positive association between au-
ditor switching and fraudulent fi-
nancial statements.
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H3a: Firms with more often audi-
tor switches have a tendency
to engage in fraudulent re-
porting.
2. Audit Opinion (AO). Vermeer
(2003) reveals that SAS No. 82 has
not changed an auditor’s tolerance
toward a client’s attempts to man-
age earnings. He even finds that
auditors have become more toler-
ant with a client’s attempts to man-
age earnings over time. Earnings
management is management deci-
sion-making process that opens
roads to incentives or insight man-
agement, terms that might lead to
the Rationalization of fraudulent
financial reporting (Beneish 1997;
Francis and Krishnan 1999;
Vermeer 2003; and Skousen and
Wright 2006). Following Skousen
and Wright (2006), this research
uses Audit Opinion as one of the
proxies for Rationalization. Thus,
this study predicts that firms com-
mitting earnings management will
tend to rationalize its fraudulent
financial reporting.
H3b: Firms that get an unqualified
opinion with an additional
explanatory language will be
more likely to engage in
fraudulent financial report-
ing.
3. Going Concern (GC). Statement
on Auditing Standard (SAS) No.
59, The Auditor’s Consideration of
Entity’s Ability to Continue As a
Going Concern, requires auditors
to assess the client’s ability to con-
tinue as a going concern and assess
management plans and provide
guidance as to what information
and steps to consider if auditors
believe that any substantial going
concerns are present. Furthermore,
the Standard considers the adequacy
of financial statement disclosure as
a sign of the ability to continue as a
going concern. Ellingsen et al.
(1989) define going concern as
management ability to continue op-
erations. They note that going con-
cern can be affected by many
causes, such as foreign competi-
tion, declining commodity prices,
and poor management. Hopwood
et al. (1994) argue that the exami-
nation of an auditor’s going-con-
cern decision should be tested us-
ing stressed and non-stressed
samples, because bankrupt firms
have potentials to engage in fraudu-
lent financial reporting. Thus, in
this research, it is expected that
firms with the presence of going
concerns are positively associated
with fraudulent financial report-
ing.
H3c: Firms with an auditor’s go-
ing-concern opinion tend to
engage in financial statement
frauds.
Sample Selection and
Description
Sample used to examine the hy-
potheses consists of 143 publicly traded
firms; 55 of which are fraudulent firms
and 88 non-fraudulent firms.
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Fraudulent Firm Selection
This research utilizes data from
three different sources. Initial sample
is retrieved from Audit Analytics,
which provides restatement data of
firms engaged in financial fraudulent
activities. These firms were allegedly
involved in fraudulent financial state-
ments between 2001 and 2006. This
study looks at 90 firms identified as
having been engaged in financial state-
ment frauds occurring during this pe-
riod. Fraudulent firms are defined as
firms obliged to do restatements be-
cause of financial frauds, irregulari-
ties, and misrepresentations. This study
subsequently collects governance
mechanism data from EDGAR SEC
Filling and Report and financial state-
ment data from COMPUSTAT data-
base for the corresponding year of the
alleged fraud. Eliminating financial
institutions (bank, insurance, etc.) and
missing or incomplete data, the sample
comprises 55 fraudulent firms, repre-
senting 28 different industries. Finan-
cial institutions are excluded from this
sample because they lack certain fi-
nancial information such as accounts
receivable and inventories (Persons
1995).
Table 1, Panel A shows fraudu-
lent firm sample selection and its dis-
tribution in the period of 2001-2006,
while Panel B presents industry repre-
sentation of fraudulent firms.
Table 1. Sample Selection Method
Panel A: Fraudulent Firm Selection
Initial fraudulent firm sample 2001 – 2006 90
Less:
- Incomplete financial data 19
- Incomplete governance data 12
- Financial Institutions 4
(35)
Total 55
Fraud Occurrence
2001 8 2004 7
2002 8 2005 17
2003 9 2006  6
55
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Continued from Table 1
Panel B: Industry Representation of Fraudulent Firms
SIC Code Industry Number Percent
10 Metal Mining 1 1.82%
12 Bituminous Coal and Lignite Surface Mining 1 1.82%
13 Drilling Oil and Gas Wells 2 3.64%
14 Mining & Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals (No Fuels) 1 1.82%
16 Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction 1 1.82%
22 Textile Mill Products 1 1.82%
23 Apparel & Other Finished Products 3 5.45%
28 Chemical and Allied Products 3 5.45%
33 Iron and Steel Foundries 1 1.82%
34 Fabricated Metal Products 1 1.82%
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 1 1.82%
36 Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components 4 7.27%
37 Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories 1 1.82%
38 Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments 1 1.82%
42 Trucking 1 1.82%
45 Air Transportation 1 1.82%
47 Arrangement of Transportation of Freight and Cargo 1 1.82%
48 Communications 1 1.82%
49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 2 3.64%
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 1 1.82%
51 Wholesale Trade - Non Durable Goods 3 5.45%
67 Holding and Other Investment Offices 1 1.82%
73 Business Services 13 23.64%
75 Services-Automotive Repair, Services & Parking 1 1.82%
78 Motion Picture and Video Tape Production and Distribution 2 3.64%
80 Health Services 3 5.45%
83 Services-Social Services 1 1.82%
87 Management Consulting Services 2 3.64%
Total 55 100.00%
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Comparing Fraudulent Firms to
Non-Fraudulent Firms
Following Beasley (1996), and
Bell and Carcello (2000), this study
uses a control group, the non-fraudu-
lent firms, in terms of year, industry,
and firm size. Matching fraudulent
and non-fraudulent firms is subject to
similar:
1. Year. This research identifies non-
fraudulent firms in the same period
of fraud occurrence from 2001 to
2006.
2. Industry. Firms in the same indus-
try are expected to have similar
business environments and ac-
counting and reporting require-
ments (St. Pierre and Anderson
1984; Persons 1995). The study
selects matched non-fraudulent
firms based on the same four-digit
SIC code (industry membership) as
that of the fraudulent firms. If there
is no similar four-digit SIC code
identified, three-digit SIC code
matching is used. If there is no
similar three-digit SIC code identi-
fied, correspondingly, a two-digit
SIC code matching is performed.
3. Firm Size. If non-fraudulent firms
identified in steps 1 and 2 are more
than five firms, they will be re-
duced to five firms whose net sales
are in the range of +/-30 percent of
the fraudulent firms’ net sales. Ac-
cording to Kaminski et al. (2004),
if the non-fraudulent firms’ net sales
are beyond the range of +/-30 per-
cent, then their total asets will be
compared to fraudulent firms’ total
assets. It is expected that the non-
fraudulent firms’ total assets will
be in the range of +/- 30 percent of
fraudulent firms’ total assets. This
study chooses five matched non-
fraudulent firms for each fraudu-
lent firm. Exception prevails if the
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
 Fraudulent No-Fraudulent
Firms Firms
Net Sales Mean 1,055.657 671.509
Median 168.861 126.479
Standard Deviation 7,199.252 1,531.789
Maximum 9,157.660 8,733.947
Minimum 1.144 0.128
Total Assets Mean 1,095.291 210.853
Median 342.586 156.020
Standard Deviation 3,070.993 197.298
Maximum 11,945.200 543.338
Minimum 36.800 26.070
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matched non-fraudulent firms in
the same industry total less than
five firms. Since this study does not
find a complete dataset using a
single criterion (net sales), an addi-
tional criterion (total assets) is nec-
essary to match fraudulent firms
and non-fraudulent firms, which
consequently may disrupt the
matching process.
Table 2 shows descriptive statis-
tics of fraudulent and non-fraudulent
firms. The table indicates that the
fraudulent firms and non-fraudulent
firms do not differ significantly based
on net sales and total assets.
Research Design
Since the dependent variable,
FRAUD, is dichotomous, the study
uses a logistic regression model to test
the hypothesis of association between
fraud risk factors and the likelihood of
fraudulent financial reporting. The re-
gression is based on a matched-pair
sample in which 38.5 percent of the
firms have committed fraudulent fi-
nancial statements and the rest have
not committed fraudulent financial
statements.
FRAUD = β0 + β1LEV + β2SALTA +
β3NPROFTA + β4INVTA +
β5RPTRANS + β6BIG4 +
β7CPA + β8GC +
β9AO + β10LnASSETS + ε
where,
FRAUD = a dummy variable with
a value of 1 if a firm is
alleged to have commit-
ted a financial statement
fraud, and a value of 0
otherwise.
LEV = ratio of Total Debt/To-
tal Assets.
SALTA = ratio of Sales/Total As-
sets.
NPROFTA = ratio of Net Profits/To-
tal Assets.
INVTA = ratio of Inventory/Total
Assets.
RPTRANS = a dummy variable with
a value of 1 if a firm is
engaged in related party
transactions and a value
of 0 otherwise.
BIG4 = a dummy variable with
a value of 1 if a firm is
audited by a Big 4 ac-
counting firm and a
value of 0 otherwise.
CPA = a dummy variable with
a value of 1 if a firm
switches its auditor and
a value of 0 otherwise.
GC = a dummy variable with
a value of 1 if a going-
concern opinion is is-
sued by auditor and a
value of 0 otherwise.
AO = a dummy variable with
a value of 1 if a firm has
an unqualified auditor
and a value of 0 other-
wise.
LnASSETS= Ln Total Assets.
ε = the residual.
In this research, FRAUD, the de-
pendent variable, is a dummy variable
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with a value of 1 (one) if a firm is
engaged in fraudulent financial state-
ment and a value of 0 (zero) otherwise.
Hypothesis 1 states that the fraud risk
factors for Pressure are positively as-
sociated with the likelihood of fraudu-
lent financial statements. More spe-
cifically, the study hypothesizes that
total debt/total assets ratio (LEV),
sales/total assets ratio (SALTA), and
net profits/total assets ratio
(NPROFTA), are related to the likeli-
hood of fraudulent financial state-
ments.
Hypothesis 2 (H2) proposes that
fraud risk factors for Opportunity are
related to the engagement in fraudu-
lent financial statements. In this case,
this research hypothesizes that inven-
tory/total assets ratio (INVTA), re-
lated party transactions (RPTRANS),
and Big 4 or 5 (BIG4), are associated
with the likelihood of financial state-
ment frauds.
Hypothesis 3 (H3) states that fraud
risk factors for Rationalization are re-
lated to the increasing tendency to
engage in fraudulent financial state-
ments. This study expects auditor
change (CPA), audit opinion (AO),
and going-concern opinion (GC) to be
associated with the likelihood of fi-
nancial statement frauds. Following
Chen and Elder (2007), this research
uses firm size (ASSETS) as a control
variable, and expects that assets is
negatively associated with the likeli-
hood of fraudulent financial statements
since firms with bigger assets (firm
size) tend to have stronger internal
controls than do smaller firms (Beasley
et al. 1999).
Following Chen and Elder (2007),
this research initially tests individual
hypotheses for each fraud risk factor
proxy, and then simultaneously uses
full regression for all three fraud risk
factor proxies. This study also includes
ASSETS as a control variable for both
individual fraud risk factor proxy and
the full regression model.
 Empirical Results and
Additional Analysis
The independent variables of this
study are selected by performing an
initial assessment of 30 variables,
which at length result in the use of 11
independent variables. Following Chen
and Elder (2007), this study selects
three independent variables for each
fraud risk factor based on statistical
criteria from the univariate analysis as
shown in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3
shows the t-test and Wilcoxon Sign-
Rank test. The correlations among de-
pendent variable and independent vari-
ables are reported in Table 4.
In selecting independent variables,
this study also uses an initial assess-
ment using all explanatory variables in
logistic regression model as in Table
5. In this step, some variables derived
from other subsequent variables are
omitted to avoid the consequences of
collinearity. The assessment finds that
these three variables, INVTA,
RPTRANS and BIG4 representing
proxies for Opportunity, are statisti-
cally significant.
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Table 3. T-tests and Wilcoxon Sign-Rank Test
Variable Fraudulent Firms NFraudulent Firms Wilcoxon Test
Means Median SD Means Median SD Z P
NCFO 0.3091 0.0000 0.4664 0.3182 0.0000 0.4684 -0.1135 0.9096
LEV 0.5683 0.5783 0.2819 0.5060 0.4600 0.2746 -1.2822 0.1998
ROA -0.1326 -0.0162 0.3412 -0.0636 0.0081 0.2525 -1.3320 0.1829
SALAR 9.2133 5.6482 13.6410 17.4856 6.2430 69.3699 -0.5270 0.5982
SALTA 1.2231 1.0190 0.9968 1.1852 0.7189 1.3767 -1.2822 0.1998
NPROFTA -0.1336 -0.0162 0.3404 -0.0643 0.0075 0.2527 -1.3486 0.1775
WCAPTA 0.2084 0.2014 0.2364 0.2086 0.2244 0.2563 -0.2677 0.7890
EBIT 392.4733 23.4440 1937.9645 92.2728 8.8015 216.7345 -1.3859 0.1658
DETEQ 0.5010 0.9540 21.6992 2.2794 0.6888 6.0173 -0.8714 0.3835
INVSAL 0.0811 0.0316 0.1077 0.0638 0.0068 0.0991 -1.2692 0.2044
INVTA 0.0876 0.0317 0.1156 0.0565 0.0116 0.0883 -1.5120 0.1305
DUALITY 0.6182 1.0000 0.4903 0.6023 1.0000 0.4922 -0.1890 0.8501
BODMEET 10.4909 9.0000 7.0261 9.0000 8.0000 4.6929 -0.8205 0.4119
BODSIZ 7.7818 8.0000 2.1662 7.4545 7.0000 1.9529 -0.7788 0.4361
INSBOD 1.7636 1.0000 0.9806 1.8409 2.0000 1.0382 -0.4765 0.6337
OUTB 6.0182 6.0000 2.1559 5.6023 5.5000 1.8291 -0.8857 0.3758
ACMEET 11.7091 9.0000 7.7212 9.7727 9.0000 6.0281 -1.2199 0.2225
ACSIZ 3.4909 3.0000 0.8136 3.3182 3.0000 0.9890 -0.6215 0.5343
OUTAC 3.4727 3.0000 0.8357 3.2841 3.0000 1.0278 -0.6550 0.5125
ACCEXP 0.9818 1.0000 0.7069 0.9545 1.0000 0.9086 -0.5578 0.5770
FINEXP 2.1636 2.0000 1.0321 1.9432 2.0000 1.2627 -1.2943 0.1956
NONBEXP 0.3273 0.0000 0.5112 0.4205 0.0000 0.6200 -0.7028 0.4822
RPTRANS 0.4545 0.0000 0.5025 0.1023 0.0000 0.3047 -4.7973 0.0000
BIG4 0.9273 1.0000 0.2621 0.7273 1.0000 0.4479 -2.9219 0.0035
CPA 0.2909 0.0000 0.4584 0.4318 0.0000 0.4982 -1.6851 0.0920
GC 0.0727 0.0000 0.2621 0.0682 0.0000 0.2535 -0.1033 0.9177
AO 0.9818 1.0000 0.1348 0.9886 1.0000 0.1066 -0.3366 0.7364
ICD 0.7091 1.0000 0.4584 0.7841 1.0000 0.4138 -1.0113 0.3119
ICA 0.5455 1.0000 0.5025 0.6705 1.0000 0.4727 -1.4948 0.1350
FRAUD = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a firm is alleged to have experience financial statement fraud
and a value of 0 otherwise.
NCFO = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a firm has negative operating cash flows and a value of 0
otherwise.
LEV = ratio of Total Debt/Total Assets.
ROA = ratio of Return/Total Assets.
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Continued from Table 3
SALAR = ratio of Net Sales/Account Receivable.
SALTA = ratio of Net Sales/Total Assets.
NPROFTA = ratio of Net Profits/Total Assets.
WCAPTA = ratio of Working Capital/Total Assets.
EBIT = Earning Before Interests and Taxes.
DETEQ = ratio of Debt/Equity.
INVSAL = ratio of Inventory/Net Sales.
INVTA = ratio of Inventory/Total Assets.
DUALITY = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm’s CEO and board chairman are the same person
and a value of 0 otherwise.
BODMEET = the number of the board meeting.
BODSIZ = the number of the board of director.
INSBOD = the number of the board of director from inside.
OUTB = the number of the board of director from outside.
ACMEET = the number of the audit committee meeting.
ACSIZ = the number of the audit committee.
OUTAC = the number of the audit committee member from outside.
ACCEXP = the number of the audit committee’s accounting expert.
FINEXP = the number of the audit committee’s financial expert.
NONBEXP = the number of the audit committee’s non accounting-financial expert.
RPTRANS = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a firm is engaged in related party transaction and a value
of 0 otherwise.
BIG4 = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a firm is audited by Big 4 accounting firm and a value of
0 otherwise.
DUALITY = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if CEO and chairman of the board are held by same person
and a value of 0 otherwise.
CPA = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a firm switches its auditor and a value of 0 otherwise.
AO = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a firm has unqualified auditor and a value of 0 otherwise.
GC = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if going concern opinion is issued by auditor and a value of
0 otherwise.
ICD = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a firm commits fraud in 2003-2006 and a value of 0 if a firm
commits fraud in 2001-2002.
ICA = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a firm commits fraud in 2004-2006 and a value of 0 if a firm
commits fraud in 2001-2003.
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Table 5. Initial Logistic Regression
FRAUD = β0 + β1NCFO + β2 LEV + β3ROA + β4SALTA + β5SALTA +β6NPROFTA + β7WCAPTA + β8EBIT + β9DETEQ + β10INVSAL
+ β11INVTA + β12DUALITY + β13BODMEET + β14BODSIZ +β15ACMEET + β16ACSIZ + β17RPTRANS + β18BIG4 + β19CPA +β20GC + β21AO + β22ICD + β23ICA + β24LnASSETS + ε
Variable1 B S.E. Wald Sig.
NCFO -0.2200 0.6256 0.1237 0.7251
LEV 0.6733 1.1490 0.3434 0.5579
ROA -12.6484 46.5418 0.0739 0.7858
SALAR -0.0008 0.0075 0.0104 0.9186
SALTA 0.0312 0.1998 0.0244 0.8757
NPROFTA 12.0467 46.6677 0.0666 0.7963
WCAPTA -0.5142 1.4945 0.1184 0.7308
EBIT 0.0013 0.0011 1.5914 0.2071
DETEQ -0.0158 0.0192 0.6760 0.4110
INVSAL -7.6260 4.6797 2.6556 0.1032
INVTA 12.1185 5.0454 5.7692 0.0163
DUALITY 0.1903 0.4647 0.1677 0.6821
BODMEET 0.0326 0.0417 0.6115 0.4342
BODSIZ -0.1666 0.1540 1.1698 0.2794
ACMEET 0.0436 0.0427 1.0412 0.3075
ACSIZ -0.1464 0.2908 0.2536 0.6146
RPTRANS 2.2838 0.5631 16.4486 0.0000
BIG4 -1.9761 0.9404 4.4161 0.0356
CPA 0.2960 0.5055 0.3429 0.5582
GC 0.3664 1.1443 0.1025 0.7488
AO -2.2302 1.7079 1.7051 0.1916
ICD 0.2037 0.7315 0.0775 0.7807
ICA 0.6797 0.6711 1.0257 0.3112
LnAssets -0.0422 0.2125 0.0394 0.8427
Intercept -1.1057 1.9682 0.3156 0.5743
Chi-Square for Model = 52.02; p-value = 0.001; Pseudo R2 = 0.414
Hosmer & L Test = 0.547
_________________
1 The variables are defined in Table 3.
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Regression Results
Table 6 statistically illustrates the
logistic regression results for each el-
ement and the full regression.
The result for each fraud risk fac-
tor –Pressure, Opportunity, and Ratio-
nalization– will be described in the
following sections as well as the full
regression for the fraud triangle.
Model 1: Pressure. In model 1 of
Table 6, NPROFTA is negatively and
significantly associated with fraudu-
lent financial statements, while LEV
and SALTA are statistically insignifi-
cant. Pseudo R2 is relatively low (0.071)
and the p-value for the model is sig-
nificant at 0.103. The result indicates
that a company with lower profitabil-
ity tends to make errors in its financial
statements or tries to make financial
statements look better by cooking the
books. This finding is in line with
Person (1995) who states that lower
profitability could encourage manage-
ment to overstate revenues or under-
state expenses.
Model 2: Opportunity. Opportunity
fraud risk factors in the model 2 of
Table 6 produce figures that are statis-
tically significant and have positive
signs for INVTA and RPTRANS, and
a negative sign for BIG4. Pseudo R2
(0.286) and p-value (0.000) also sup-
port the association between INVTA,
RPTRANS, and BIG4, and the likeli-
hood of committing frauds. The re-
sults are consistent with the second
hypothesis, which states that the prox-
ies are significant in explaining the
link between Opportunity fraud risk
factors and the tendency to commit
financial statement frauds. Auditors
should be careful in conducting inven-
tory audits since it involves a subjec-
tive estimation and can easily be falsi-
fied. Related party transactions also
give an opportunity to commit frauds
since it may not reflect arm’s-length
bargaining between involved parties.
These transactions can greatly influ-
ence revenue recognition if defects
exist. Finally, audit quality –proxied
by audit-firm size, brand name, and its
ability to mitigate agency problems–
may also support the indication of
fraud. Accounting firms –Big 4 usu-
ally provide a better audit quality, so
they can reduce the opportunity to
commit frauds.
Model 3: Rationalization. The third
model tests the relationship between
Rationalization fraud risk factors and
the likelihood of financial statement
frauds. Model 3 shows that none of the
fraud risk factors for Rationalization
is statistically significant. The result
indicates that it is very difficult for
auditors to observe fraud risk factors
for Rationalization using public data,
such as financial statements, analyst
reports, performance reports, agenda,
etc. Rationalization of fraud may only
be appropriately revealed by interview-
ing perpetrators as Cressey (1953) did.
This finding is also consistent with
prior studies. Skousen and Wright
(2006) fail to indentify and measure
appropriate proxies. Brazel et al. (2007)
intentionally do not try to make asso-
ciation between fraud risk factors for
Rationalization and the likelihood of
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fraudulent financial statements. They
argue that there is very limited or even
no public data available to indentify
and measure Rationalization for
fraudulent behavior of management.
Model 4: Full Regression of
Fraud Triangle. Model 4 of Table 6
displays the results of a full regression
performed simultaneously using all
proxies for Pressure, Opportunity, and
Rationalization. The model finds that
all three proxies for Opportunity
(INVTA, RPTRANS, and BIG4) are
consistently significant, while
NPROFTA from Pressure fraud risk
factors is no longer significant. Ratio-
nalization variables remain insignifi-
cant, and consistently support that
Rationalization of fraud triangle seems
to be the most difficult factor to be
observed using public data.
Additional Analysis
Predictive Fraud Model and Robust-
ness. In the next step, an additional
analysis is presented in order to study
further the possibility of fraud predic-
tion model. For this purpose, this re-
search uses the following model:
FRAUD= β0 + β1NPROFTA +
β2 INVTA +
β3RPTRANS + β4BIG4 +
β5LnASSETS + ε
where,
FRAUD = a dummy variable with
a value of 1 if a firm is
alleged to have com-
mitted a financial state-
ment fraud and a value
of 0 otherwise
NPROFTA = ratio of Net Profits/To-
tal Assets
INVTA = ratio of Inventory/To-
tal Assets
RPTRANS = a dummy variable with
a value of 1 if a firm is
engaged in related party
transactions and a value
of 0 otherwise
BIG4 = a dummy variable with
a value of 1 if a firm is
audited by a Big 4 ac-
counting firm and a
value of 0 otherwise
LnASSETS = Ln Total Assets
ε = Residual
These variables are employed be-
cause they are statistically significant
at the individual level and in full re-
gression scale, except for NPROFTA
that is only significant at the indi-
vidual level. The regression results are
presented in Table 7. INVTA,
RPTRANS and BIG4 are consistently
significant to the likelihood of com-
mitting frauds, while NPROFTA is no
longer significant. Table 7 also pre-
sents the goodness-of-fit measures. The
model’s chi-square is 35.5 and statisti-
cally significant at <0.01. Pseudo R2 is
relatively higher (0.299) and p-value
is significant at p<0.01. This model is
seemingly appropriate for further
analysis since both chi-square and
pseudo R2 are significant.
Adhering to Skousen and Wright
(2006), this study uses multiple dis-
criminant analysis (MDA) and sensi-
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tivity analysis to examine whether
those fraud risk factors can be used to
construct a fraud prediction model.
One of the discriminant analysis meth-
ods is cross-validation method, which
removes the first observation from the
dataset and builds a discriminant model
using the remaining observations
(Jones 1987; Hair et al. 1995; and
Kuruppu et al. 2003; Skousen and
Wright 2006). Cross-validation method
is very effective in providing an unbi-
ased estimate of a model’s mis-classi-
fication rate (Hair et al. 1995) and is
particularly useful in studies with small
sample size since the entire sample can
be used to cross-validate the results
(Kuruppu et al. 2003; Skousen and
Wright 2006).
After performing the cross-vali-
dation method, the results as reported
in Table 8 show that model accuracy is
approximately 67.1 percent (or the
overall misclassification rate of the
model is 32.9 percent). Still in Table 8,
the model correctly classifies non-
fraudulent firms by 77 percent and
correctly classifies fraudulent firms
by 51 percent. Compared with
Kaminski et al. (2004) who have a
model success rate of 30 to 40 percent,
this model has achieved a higher level
of prediction and also has a lower
misclassification for both fraudulent
firms and non-fraudulent firms.
Kaminski et al. (2004) correctly clas-
sify fraudulent firms by 2 to 42 percent
and non-fraudulent firms by 84 to 90
percent.
Table 7. Fraud Prediction Model
FRAUD= β0 + β1NPROFTA + β2INVTA + β3RPTRANS+ β4BIG4 +β5LnASSETS + ε
Chi-Square for Model = 35.5
p-value = 0.000
Pseudo R2 = 0.299
Hosmer & L Test = 0.257
Variable Coefficient S.E. Wald p-value
Intercept -1.622 0.851 3.638 0.056 *
NPROFTA -0.947 0.740 1.638 0.201
INVTA 4.605 2.230 4.265 0.039 **
RPTRANS 1.753 0.468 14.056 0.000 ***
BIG4 -1.587 0.736 4.646 0.031 **
LnAssets 0.091 0.124 0.546 0.460
*,**, and *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectivel
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Conclusion
This research examines fraud risk
factors and constructs a model to pre-
dict the likelihood of fraudulent finan-
cial statements based on the fraud tri-
angle notion, which is adopted in SAS
No.99 of AICPA (2002). From various
setting of research designs, this study
identifies some fraud risk factors that
are significantly associated with the
likelihood of committing frauds. Con-
sistent with prior research, Pressure–
represented by net profit/total assets
(NPROFTA)–and Opportunity–repre-
sented by inventory/total assets
(INVTA), related party transaction
(RPTRANS), and Big 4 of audit firms
(BIG4)–are significantly related to the
financial reporting frauds. Meanwhile,
none of the Rationalization variables
is found to be statistically relevant to
the model. It seems that Rationaliza-
tion attributes are more difficult to
observe using public data than the other
two elements of the fraud triangle–
Pressure and Opportunity.
The second objective of this re-
search is to construct a model to pre-
dict the likelihood of committing frauds
using the identified fraud risk factors.
Using the cross-validation method of
discriminant analysis, it is indicated
that the model can predict the ten-
dency of fraudulent financial report-
ing with a relatively high success rate.
Overall, the model correctly classifies
firms by 67.1 percent; additionally,
the model correctly classifies non-
fraudulent firms by 77 percent and
fraudulent firms by 51 percent.
Nevertheless, there are some limi-
tations of this research. First, fraudu-
lent firm data are very limited. Only
information on fraudulent firms sub-
ject to SEC enforcement actions is
publicly available. Second, the predic-
Table 8. Discriminate Analysis
Predicted Group
Membership
NFRAUD FRAUD Total
Count NFRAUD 71 17 88
FRAUD 24 31 55
% NFRAUD 81% 19% 71.30%
FRAUD 44% 56%
Count NFRAUD 68 20 88
FRAUD 27 28 55
% NFRAUD 77% 23% 67.10%
FRAUD 49% 51%
Original
Cross-validated
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tive fraud model may misclassify non-
fraudulent firms, which have in fact
committed fraud, but have not been
subject to the SEC enforcement.
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